Abstract. This paper suggests that stabilizing federalism is like solving a public good provision problem. It reviews results in the public good provision literature that are relevant for federalism, and discusses the implications of these results for the institutional design of federalism.
Federalism now reaches to all corners of the globe, yet in political science we still lack a basic understanding of how to design institutions to maximize the chances that a federation will be successful. We write federal constitutions without knowing what might best be included to maximize the possibility of peace and prosperity. We advocate adoption of the constitutional architecture of successful federations, a policy that will meet with diminishing success as federalism moves from the western developed world to cultures and contexts that are quite different. Some adopt federal constitutions despite our relative ignorance, such as Russia, Bosnia, South Africa, and Iraq. Others hesitate, lacking confidence in their ability to engineer a successful federation. For example, Afghanistan would have been a natural case for federation, given its regions' histories of political independence, but Afghani constitutional planners and their consultants rejected a federal solution, not knowing how to build a federation strong enough to resist the peripheralizing forces of aggressive, competitive provinces. And in Argentina, the federal government is pleading for another restructuring of its debt repayment scheme, despite being unable to find a remedy for the root cause of its fiscal misfortune: provinces who have little incentive to balance their books, despite the ill effects for the national economy.
What makes a federation successful, robust? Is it historical accident, cultural influences, or the institutional elements in a constitution that affect its success? If institutions matter, have we fully explored their significance? In this paper I advocate a new approach to the study of federalism that describes federalism as a public good provision problem. The implication of this description is that we are able to enlist our understanding of how public good provision problems may be resolved to the design of federalism. However, these results must be modified to fit the particular challenges that federalism presents. This paper focuses on how a network of institutions, complementary in their functional capacity, makes federations productive. In so doing, the project departs from existing studies, which have focused on the effect of the existence of particular institutions-often considered in isolation-on the longevity of the federation or distributional aspects of it.
It is not the welfare of the federal government that concerns us; the government is a means, designed to improve the lives of its citizens. Therefore the lifespan of the union is only an indirect proxy; it can reflect government performance, but governments can endure for other reasons as well: consider the longevity of the authoritarian regimes in Cuba, China, and the USSR. Our real interest is how well the government serves its people, how well it performs its designated tasks. This is what we mean by robustness.
Robustness focuses attention on the connection between the federations' organizational architecture and its performance. The theory has its roots in the public good provision literature, which I have expanded to accommodate the complexities of federalism. Lessons learned from these models cause us to focus on complementarities between the functional capacities of institutions, rather than the existence of particular institutions. In this manner, constitutions may be locally adapted to fit cultural and environmental context, while meeting the needs of a robust federation.
The paper proceeds as follows. I first define federalism and robustness more completely. In the second section, I develop the reasons for forming a federation, each which displays characteristics of a classic public good provision problem. In the third section I review results in the public good provision literature relevant to federalism, and in the fourth, I discuss how these results help us to understand the institutional design of federalism. The fifth section concludes.
Definitions
Studies of successful federations to date have been plagued by definitional problems, leaving (frustratingly, improbably) both the subject and the dependent variable undefined. In this Section I define both subject and dependent variable.
Federalism
It is not a straightforward task to list all federations in existence. Definitions are often too vague to enable objective coding.
2 Many works eschew formal definitions altogether, arguing that federalism has an intuitive quality that formally cannot be defined but is recognizable. Elazar (1987) argues that federalism is a process as well as a structure (see also Beer 1993 and Ostrom 1991) . Therefore, most political theorists agree that a polity must be federal in practice as well as form, but defining federal practice is elusive. It quickly degenerates into a youknow-it-when-you-see-it science, and the variation in the lists of federations manifests this controversy. While many agree on about a dozen cases of federalism, including the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Germany, another two to three dozen cases are contentious: Spain, Italy, Venezuela, the USSR, China, Great Britain, and the European Union.
In rejecting a structural definition of federalism because it fails to guarantee federal practice, we may be skipping over a clue that could help us to identify what makes a
